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Financial Statements
By Jared a. ellias
A major shift in chapter 11 practice in the past decade has been the emergence of hedge funds that specialize in investing in dis-
tressed debt. Their presence in the reorganization 
of large firms is pervasive: In 2009 and 2010, they 
invested in more than 70 percent of the chapter 11 
cases of large firms.1 Distressed hedge funds wield 
more than $100 billion in capital and aim to use 
their expertise in the bankruptcy process to profit 
from investing in the claims of large distressed 
firms.2 To that end, they deploy both active and pas-
sive investing strategies. While recent research has 
shed some light on the impact of these funds on the 
bankruptcy process, much remains unknown.
 In a recent paper,3 the author conducted the first 
study of one of the most important active-investing 
strategies: Buying lower-priority claims like unse-
cured debt and equity and hiring lawyers to participate 
in the bankruptcy process (hereinafter, the “study”). 
This strategy is referred to as “junior activism.” Junior 
activists are well-known for their willingness to chal-
lenge managers and senior creditors in the boardroom 
and courtroom. Like activists investing more gener-
ally, junior activism is a source of controversy. 
 Critics view junior activists as opportunists 
that file meritless motions and objections to extract 
hold-up value settlements. To quote Wilbur Ross 
in his testimony to the ABI Commission to Study 
the Reform of Chapter 11, “[junior creditors] know 
that terrorist [litigation] tactics can lead to conces-
sions from economically superior claimants and that 
even when they don’t, litigation sometimes results 
in decisions that bestow value on the nominally 
lower-ranking class.”4 In theory, this frivolous liti-
gation is also thought to increase bankruptcy costs, 
undermining the chapter 11 policy goal of maximiz-
ing creditor recoveries. 
 Junior activists, on the other hand, believe that 
they counter the perverse incentives of managers of 
chapter 11 debtors. Chapter 11 leaves managers in 
control of the bankruptcy process and requires them 
to maximize creditor recoveries. In performing this 
duty, managers face what economists call a “moral 
hazard”: If the firm is reorganized in a transaction 
that is appraised at a discount to the firm’s true 
value, managers and senior creditors can profit at 
the expense of junior claimants by extracting value 
that would go to junior constituencies if the process 
was run fairly. Junior activists claim that they inter-
vene to stop managers and senior creditors from 
exploiting their control over the bankruptcy process 
to enrich themselves at the expense of junior claim-
ants. Which of these views is accurate?
 This article summarizes the main results from 
the study. Obviously, it is not possible to general-
ize and say that junior activists are always acting 
in line with the predictions of their detractors or 
that they never are. In reality, both views of junior 
activism are probably correct in individual cases, 
and anecdotal evidence supports both positions. 
The study moves the debate forward by using 
quantitative tools to try to estimate the average 
effect of junior activism across a sizable sample of 
bankruptcy cases. The two views of junior activ-
ism provide different testable empirical predictions 
about junior activism. 
 If the criticism of junior activism is accurate, 
junior activism is expected to be correlated with set-
tlements outside of the absolute priority rule (sug-
gesting that the junior activist might have received 
hold-up value), and we would expect to see increas-
es in bankruptcy costs. If junior activists are correct, 
junior activism is expected to be associated with an 
increase in the appraised value of the restructuring 
transaction, implying higher creditor recoveries and 
allocation of the firm’s value in line with the abso-
lute priority rule. 
 These predictions were taken to a hand-collected 
dataset of 107 large firms that filed for chapter 11 in 
2009-10. To measure junior activism, a methodology 
was developed that could be referred to as a “litiga-
tion score.” The intuition behind this research design 
is that portions of junior activism could be observed 
systematically in all bankruptcy cases: The litiga-
tion, their court victories and the identity of junior 
activists were treated as a proxy for the things that 
could not be reliably observed, such as out-of-court 
negotiations. The more litigation — the objections to 
the debtor’s key motions, requests for judicial relief 
like motions to appoint trustees and examiner — the 
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higher the score. The methodology is explained in greater 
detail in the study, but it generally allowed one to distinguish 
the cases where junior activists were relatively more active 
from the ones where they appeared to play less of a role. 
Table 1 summarizes observed junior activist litigation.
 Let’s review the findings that are consistent with the 
view that junior activists play an important role in corpo-
rate governance that is consistent with bankruptcy policy 
goals. First, the evidence suggests that junior activist 
litigation is associated with an increase in the appraised 
value of the restructuring transaction. This supports the 
view that junior activists positively impact chapter 11. 
Depending on the facts of the case, the junior activist 
might have increased the appraised transaction value by 
pushing a reluctant management team into a transaction 
that maximized the firm’s true value. Alternatively, the 
junior activist might have prevented management and 
senior lenders from obtaining an artificially low apprais-
al from their investment banker. In addition, the market 
prices of senior claims at the end of the bankruptcy pro-
cess were examined and no evidence was found that the 
observed increase in the appraisal results in the firm being 
overvalued and senior creditors undercompensated. 
 Second, a calculation of the market value of the firm’s 
outstanding debt and equity on the date that the firm filed 
for bankruptcy was obtained by using a subset of the study’s 
data. This allowed the study to control for the market’s 
recovery expectations at the beginning of the bankruptcy 
process. Controlling for changes in credit market conditions 
and other important variables, junior activism appears to be 
positively correlated with the bankruptcy process, producing 
higher creditor recoveries than the market anticipated prior to 
the bankruptcy process. This suggests that junior activists are 
at least savvy investors. It also provides support for the view 
that they contribute expertise that improves the outcome of 
the bankruptcy process.
 Third, bond and loan returns were examined around key 
bankruptcy hearings, and a single relationship between post-
hearing returns for junior claimholders and the presence of 
a junior activist was found. This correlation appears to be 
driven by the junior activist’s prosecution of objection to 
management’s motions. While more data would be needed 
to come to firm conclusions, the observed increase in the 
value of the junior claim does not appear to be a transfer 
from senior creditors. This finding is also consistent with 
the notion that junior activists play a crucial governance role 
that checks management’s powers as a debtor in possession 
at important points in the bankruptcy process.
 Fourth, the firms that recapitalized with supporting 
investment banker appraisals were examined to look for evi-
dence of junior activist influence. These investment bankers 
calculated a range of estimated value, with a high, low and 
mid-point estimate. The range appears to be narrower for the 
cases with junior activist involvement, which is consistent 
with the notion that junior activists contribute expertise that 
reduces the randomness of the appraisal process and, togeth-
er with the evidence of higher appraisals, is broadly consis-
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Table 2: Estimated Value of Distributions Outside of Absolute Priority in Favor of Junior Activists
Estimated Value
Consideration Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation
Warrants (n=17) / Cash (n=5)
Value of Cash (n=5) 900,000 11,000,000 6,380,000 7,000,000 3,615,522
% Total Enterprise Value (n=5) 1.00% 4.80% 3.02% 2.43% 1.73%
% Funded Debt (n=5) 0.50% 2.50% 1.50% 1.30% 0.70%
Equity (n=10)*
Value of Equity (n=9) 1,240,000 99,400,000 24,000,000 4,386,000 33,900,000
% Reorganized Equity (n=10) 1.00% 7.50% 3.75% 3.50% 2.12%
% Total Enterprise Value (n=9) 0.27% 3.15% 1.92% 1.69% 1.15%
% Funded Debt (n=9) 0.18% 2.86% 1.37% 1.45% 0.89%
* In six cases, warrants and equity were distributed outside of the absolute priority rule, so the total value of the distribution was higher.
Table 1: Litigation Activity of Junior Activists
Objections to Management’s 
Major Motions Filed
n %
Finance Motion 35 32.71%
Disclosure Statement 40 37.38%
Sale Motion 18 16.82%
Reorganization Plan 21 19.63%
Junior Activist Extraordinary 
Requests for Relief Filed Granted
n % n %
Appoint Examiner 8 7.48% 1 0.93%
Appoint Trustee 2 1.87% 0 0.00%
Terminate Exclusivity 5 4.67% 1 0.93%
Appoint Additional Official Committee 12 11.21% 8 7.48%
File Own Plan 4 3.74%
Identity of Junior Activist
n %
Hedge Fund or Private-Equity 
Firm Observed
60 56.07%
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tent with what one would expect if junior activists positively 
influenced the governance of bankrupt firms by constraining 
opportunistic underappraisals.
 On the other hand, some evidence supported the conten-
tions of the critics of junior activism. Payments outside of the 
absolute priority rule were observed in 27 percent of sample 
cases. However, the value distributed outside of the absolute 
priority rule was relatively small (generally ranging between 
1-3 percent of the appraised transaction value). Table 2 on 
p. 29 summarizes distributions outside of the absolute prior-
ity rule. It seems unlikely that these small settlements would 
make the investment that junior activists make in lawyer and 
investment banker fees profitable, which suggests that hedge 
funds would be unlikely to litigate opportunistically in search 
of these small observed payments.
 Evidence was also found that suggests that junior activ-
ist litigation is associated with higher attorneys’ fees, which 
makes intuitive sense. After all, if junior activists are filing 
objections, the debtor’s attorneys will incur additional fees 
in responding to them and preparing for trial. However, the 
magnitude of the implied cost increase is relatively low, and 
direct bankruptcy costs themselves are a mere 1.3 percent 
of the appraised value of the median sample case. In addi-
tion, a relationship between junior activism and the length 
of the bankruptcy case was not observable, which mitigates 
the worry of critics that overly litigious hedge funds prolong 
bankruptcy cases.
Conclusion
 The results of the study support both the claims of junior 
activists and the claims of their detractors. On the whole, the 
findings are inconsistent with the claim that activist investors 
buy junior claims and abuse the bankruptcy system to extract 
hold-up payments. No evidence was found of large pay-
ments outside of the absolute priority rule, and junior activ-
ists appear to focus their efforts on relatively more valuable 
cases, inconsistent with the expectation of indiscriminate liti-
gation. Moreover, the study found evidence suggesting that 
junior activism is correlated with unexpectedly high creditor 
recoveries and other corroborating evidence that supports the 
view that junior activists contribute expertise to bankruptcy 
cases that lead to better outcomes. 
 However, it is important to qualify these results by noting 
that the methodology used in the study could not eliminate 
the possibility that the observed positive correlation between 
junior activism and the final appraisal is better explained as 
a non-random and savvy selection of target firms by sophis-
ticated investors. It does seem unlikely that junior activists 
would correctly identify undervalued firms and then reduce 
their returns by the millions of dollars they spend on lawyers 
and investment bankers to participate in the process, but the 
results from the data cannot conclusively reject this possibility. 
Nonetheless, the results in the study shift the burden of proof 
onto the critics of junior activism to show that there is a prob-
lem with overly litigious hedge funds abusing the bankruptcy 
system, but further research is needed to learn more about the 
impact that hedge funds might have on the bankruptcy process. 
The results in this study cautiously suggest that junior activist 
investing strategies might be, on average, beneficial.  abi
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[T]he results in the study shift 
the burden of proof onto the 
critics of junior activism to show 
that there is a problem with 
overly litigious hedge funds 
abusing the bankruptcy system, 
but further research is needed 
to learn more about the impact 
that hedge funds might have on 
the bankruptcy process[.]
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